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Mind Your Own Business: The Trouble with Justice in Plato’s Republic

Abstract
The Republic’s paradoxical definition of justice—minding one’s own business—comes
mainly from Socrates’ examination of the arts. The definition applies well to artisans who
specialize in single trades, but poorly to warriors who meddle in everyone’s affairs. Are
the warriors then unjust? Rather than conclude that they are, the paper maintains that
justice is conditioned by class and that the justice practiced by warriors (self-sacrificing
and homogenizing) differs from the justice practiced by workers (self-serving and
differentiating). But because the formal definition never changes, despite the
awkwardness of fit, the paper further suggests that something is askew with justice, with
its demand for right order, and that the transcendence of justice is a goal which the
dialogue secretly endorses. The paper thus supports those scholars who contend that the
Republic falls short in its efforts to prove the goodness of justice or who see in the
Republic a warning against the perfection of justice.
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Mind Your Own Business: The Trouble with Justice in Plato’s Republic
Scholars over the years have given careful and copious attention to Plato’s
Republic, though not always to its subtitled topic, justice, and not principally to the first
of its two justice questions, the meaning of justice. Rather, the second justice question,
the goodness of justice—or the truth of Socrates’ claim that justice leads to happiness—is
the subject which scholars find the more intriguing (e.g., Sachs 1971, Vlastos 1971;
White 1984; Kraut, 1997). This paper focuses on the first of these questions (touching on
the second briefly at the end) and offers as a definition of justice—order.
The dialogue, though, defines justice differently, as minding one’s own business.
Examination of this definition shows that it derives from the technical arts, in particular
from the division of labor, and that it describes, quite accurately, the behavior and
responsibilities of the artisan class. But when applied to the warrior class, the definition,
while not incomprehensible, is peculiar and inapt—indeed, given the behavior and
responsibilities of the warrior class, it is the last definition that would come to mind. Are
the warriors then unjust, or, if just, does justice change its meaning? Neither conclusion is
warranted, at least not fully: the warriors are just—after a fashion—and the meaning of
justice remains the same—so long as one understands that justice, substantively, is order.
As for minding one’s own business, the formal definition, it now is explained as the
motive for maintaining order and the manner in which order is maintained. But it is the
motive and manner of artisans, not of warriors, who maintain order as patriots, not as
professionals, and by self-abnegation in a community of pleasure and pain, not by selfabsorption in specialized arts. Warriors practice justice differently because their duties
are different as is their potential for harm.
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The conundrum that just warriors seem hardly to mind their own business is
accounted for partly by the realization that justice, at bottom, is order (which the warriors
also, but differently, maintain) and that right order exists where discrete parts are
arranged to comprise an integral whole capable of performing a specific function. But
then a problem arises, for Socrates’ city seems neither to have a function more specific
than its own self-preservation nor to have parts genuinely distinct. Justice is an
abstraction which no city or soul can perfectly embody. The point, however, is not that
Socrates’ political and pedagogical foundings fail to measure up, but that the measure
itself is not good, that justice as order comes at the price of individual achievement.
Evidence is presented that the city is straining against its own order, or that subjects and
citizens, in each of the classes, are quietly encouraged to transcend justice, to move
beyond their partiality and strive to become complete. It finally is suggested that the
reason why justice is so strangely, so unattractively, and, in the case of warriors, so
inappropriately defined—as minding one’s own business—is precisely to provoke just
this sort or resistance. Other scholars, mainly of the Straussian persuasion, have come to
a similar conclusion (Strauss 1964, 127; Bloom 1991, 409-11; Nichols 1987, 122-23), but
none by the route taken herein.

The Characteristics of Justice
What is justice? It is truth-telling and giving back what is owed, says Cephalus,
the aging, metic patriarch whose home is the site of Plato’s Republic (331c). Not exactly,
interjects Polemarchus, Cephalus’s solicitous son; justice, rather, is helping friends and
hurting enemies (332d). Nonsense, thunders Thrasymachus, the impatient and petulant
sophist. Justice is the advantage of the stronger (338c); it is ruling (with all the trappings
4

of law and justice) for the sake of the rulers—the strong. But who are the rulers and who
are the strong, queries Glaucon, a companion of Socrates and the dialogue’s most
perspicacious interlocutor. Are not the many strong against the few, and is not justice
their agreement not to do wrong so as not to suffer wrong? Justice, he proposes, is a
social contract mutually useful to all (weaklings) who sign on (359a-b). Or is justice
something infinitely more mysterious? When Socrates finally declares himself, after
founding a city in speech and locating its several virtues, he defines justice as “the
minding of one’s own business and not being a busybody” (ta hautou prattein kai mē
polupragmonein) (433a8-9).1
As mysterious as this definition may be, it is not wholly unexpected, since
Socrates prepares for it by his responses to the expository efforts of others. Thrasymachus
likens the sophist-trained ruler to a precise artisan, and Socrates replies that such a ruler
would not employ his art for selfish advantage but for the benefit of the ruled (340d342e). The professionalism that comes from doing one thing only and doing it well—i.e.,
from minding one’s own business—obliges the artisan to keep faith with the standards of
his craft. Also, the city of pigs, constructed by Socrates in answer to Glaucon’s brief
against justice (and that by Adeimantus, Glaucon’s brother), has as its foundational
principle “one person one art” (heis mian) (370b6), or the division of labor, which
Socrates later suggests is a “phantom” of justice (eidōlon) (443c4). In fact, from the very
beginning, in response to Cephalus and Polemarchus, Socrates implies a kinship between
justice and knowledge, insisting that the just man is one who knows ends (the

1

Translations of the Greek are from Bloom 1991. Line numbers are those in Platonis Opera, vol.

IV 1978 and are given only when necessary.
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consequences of truth-telling and repayment of debts) and one who knows means (the
how-to skill of craft). Just behavior seems thus to arise from technical knowledge, itself
the product of specialized labor, and specialized labor seems to be the standard way in
which people go about minding their own business. 2
What then can we infer about justice, defined as minding one’s own business,
once we know its ties to, and perhaps its origin in, the practice of art?3 First, that
justice—much to our wonderment—is privatizing, meaning that justice is nonrelational
or minimally relational. It is nonrelational in the case of the jack-of-all-trades, as he
2

The standard way in which Socrates’ contemporaries mind their own business, as determined by

scholars studying the history ta hautou prattein and apragmosynē, is by political quietism, both domestic
and foreign, its opposite, political activism—i.e., litigiousness on the part of individuals, presumptuousness
on the part of the demos, and imperialism on the part of the state. Oftentimes this quietism (hēsuchia or
apragmosunē) is applauded, but sometimes it is condemned, with busyness (polupragmosunē)
recommended instead (e.g., Thucydides, II.40; Plato, Statesman, 307e; Aristotle, Constitution of Athens,
8.5). Socrates once uses “minding one’s own business” this way, to justify the apoliticism of the
philosopher living in a corrupt state (496d), and he may intend this meaning when he describes ta hautou
prattein and mē polupragmonein as expressions “we have both heard from many others and have often said
ourselves” (433a9-b1). But notwithstanding the currency of these expressions, Socrates’ derivation of them
from divided labor (heis mian) (433a, 443c) is quite the novelty, and one with ramifications for the city’s
structure and its distribution of power (philosophers rule because they are knowledgeable, not warriors
because they are proud).
For a discussion of apragmosunē/polupragmosunē in the foreign affairs of Greek politics, see
Ehrenberg 1947, 46-67. For a discussion of the same in the domestic (and foreign) affairs of Greek politics,
see Adkins 1976, 301-27. For a general study of apragmosunē, see Carter 1986.
3

Parry (1996) defends use of the craft analogy when discussing justice in the Republic against

others who treat it as a Socratic vestige discarded after Book 1 (Irwin 1977, 8, 185; Reeve 1988, 22-23).
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might be called (Benardete 1989, 49), the unassociated subsistence worker who supplies
all his needs and shares his produce with no one—and about whom the phrase “minding
one’s own business” is first used (369e-370a).4 It is minimally relational in the case of the
artisan who plies his own one trade and is related as producer and consumer to other
artisans plying separate trades of their own.5 The farmer sells his corn to the carpenter
and buys his plow from the blacksmith and is otherwise little obligated to his neighbors.6

4

In its last use, the phrase is nonrelational as well, as it describes the private life chosen by the

shade of Odysseus (620c).
5

For Annas (1981, 74-76), minding one’s own business (which she translates as “doing one’s own

thing”) is suggestive of a needy, social, and cooperative human nature and is seen as imposing restraints
and duties on the individual should he or she ever take a fancy to trying something new. Annas discovers
these communal proclivities and responsibilities in the residents of the city of pigs. But then she also
describes the residents as “motivated in their association entirely by self-interest” (78); and elsewhere she
says of their ergonomic descendants, the artisans of the producing class, that they are not engaged in the
public life of the city nor expected to make sacrifices for its values (172). So, is minding one’s own
business a socializing or individualizing principle? Vlastos says it’s the former (1977, 18). I would say it’s
the latter, but that the potential for socialization, or for what I will call transcendence, lies latent within it.
6

Using Aristotle for a guide, one might incline to the thought that arts are hierarchical, with the

bridle maker taking orders from the horseman, the horseman taking orders from the general, and the
general taking orders from the statesman (Nicomachean Ethics 1094a6-16). But Socrates does little to
invite this line of thought: his arts seem rather to operate independently, connecting only at the point of
exchange. The excellence of the plow, for example, depends on the expertise of the blacksmith, or
toolmaker, and hardly at all on information supplied by the farmer, who minds the business of agriculture
(370b-d). There is, of course, a higher art of guarding which assigns people their trades, but the chief aim of
this art is to keep the classes separate, not to integrate them in a single enterprise (e.g., the uncertainty
surrounding the moral education of the workers [see below, n. 27]). Or, if integration is the purpose, as to
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It is said that artisans enjoy “sweet intercourse” with one another (372b7); this they may
do, but their communal feasting, in the city of “utmost necessity” (369d11), is not an
activity connected to justice. Need is the basis of justice, and exchange is the activity by
which justice is practiced (371e-372a).7 Of the two, the jack-of-all-trades is the more selfsufficient and self-involved, but he is quickly discarded in favor of the specialized artisan
because divided labor develops the natural aptitudes of workers and differentiates them
by trade (370a-c).
So, the second thing we learn from the association of justice and art is that justice
is specializing, and, as a related third, that it is differentiating. Artisans are not
interchangeable laborers but are separate, individuated beings. The shoemaker is different
from the weaver because neither can do the work of the other. Shoemaker and weaver are
known by their crafts. How common it is for people, when introducing themselves, to
specify what work they do: “Hi, my name is Sam Malone; I’m a barkeeper and exbaseball player”; or to inquire as to the occupation of others: “Nice to meet you; what line

some degree it is (e.g., the moderation of the workers [432a]), the virtue which carries out this supervisory
work is wisdom, not justice (443e).
Stauffer (2001, 74-77) observes that Socrates, in the interchange with Thrasymachus (342a-c), is
oddly uncurious about the deficiency of arts (e.g., horse training’s dependence on farming) and happy to
have them described as “without blemish or taint” (342b5). Stauffer then explains this insouciance in light
of the trap which Socrates is setting for Thrasymachus over the question of precise art and its obligation to
serve. In any event, we have here another instance in which arts are presented as self-contained activities,
complete and sovereign within their own spheres.
7

This is Adeimantus’s suggestion, which Socrates neither confirms nor denies. Instead, he

describes the way of life of these first artisans before turning to Glaucon’s luxurious city as the better place
in which to find justice and injustice (372e).
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of work are you in?” Occupation defines people; it individuates, it differentiates, it
confers identity. It also causes dependence. Without the shepherd, the weaver has no
wool; without the weaver the house builder has no coat. Divided labor binds the arts
together in a network of mutual dependencies. There is community in that network, if
only of the minimalist kind.
We are told that true art is knowledge put to service for others (342c-d). The
doctor in the precise sense serves his patients, the pilot in the precise sense serves his
passengers. Accordingly, artisans serve themselves by the wages they collect—usually
money, though other forms of compensation exist (347a).
How then do these separate, individuated, and dependent beings—these
specialized, fee-for-service artisans—relate? At first quite haphazardly, because their city
of pigs is an unregulated marketplace (though one seemingly protected by an invisible
hand ensuring the proper supply and distribution of artisans). But when Socrates and his
cofounders move from the true and healthy city to the luxurious and feverish city, and
from there to the purged city (399e8) of guardians and auxiliaries, the relation among the
arts falls under closer scrutiny. Need, aptitude, and good fortune are insufficient to
arrange the various arts because class division and government arrive in tandem with the
warriors. The parts of the city are no longer just arts, separate but equal; they now are
classes, separate and unequal, and designated by their metallic qualities: gold, silver,
bronze, or iron. Likewise, command, obedience, and common purpose all enter the city.
With these the association changes from a loose aggregation of crafts to a highly
structured, articulated whole. The city becomes a composition, with differentiated parts
performing tasks for which they are specially designed. Were the city a bicycle, its form
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would include a frame, handlebar, and seat, and wheels, tires, chains, peddles, and
brakes; and the parts would keep to their places and mind their separate businesses in
order for the bike to accomplish its vehicular mission. The seat, for instance, would not
ask to change places with the handlebar so as to have a chance at steering, because the
ride would be unsafe as well as uncomfortable! Like a bicycle then, the city, divided by
classes, is a hierarchy of parts. Similarly, justice is a hierarchy, an arrangement of
discrete and unequal components into a functional unit.
Justice then, defined as minding one’s own business and extrapolated from the
arts, exhibits the following five characteristics: specialization, differentiation,
dependence, fee-for-service, and privacy (saved for last). The artisan is a specialist who
practices only one craft. He derives his separate and distinct identity from the art that he
perfects and the role that he performs. He depends on other specialists to supply his
unmet needs. He is useful to his customers through the product that he sells and useful to
himself through the fee that he earns. And, in general, he is private; he keeps to himself,
is minimally relational, and does not meddle in the affairs of others. Justice exists where
there are (as in the case of the bicycle) specialized, differentiated, and interdependent
parts, rightly related, with each part sticking to its own job, and with the collection of
parts forming a purposeful whole.

Justice and the Warriors
But if this is justice as applied to artisans, what about justice as applied to
warriors? Is the warrior a just man (or woman) for being specialized, differentiated,
dependent, compensated for services, and private? Warriors are specialists in the art of
war, added to the city out of deference to the principle of one person one art (374b). So,
10

yes, warriors are specialists—except that the art they are taught is not the art of war per se
(we hear nothing about their training as heavy-armed infantry), but music and
gymnastics; and the wars they fight are not against neighboring states (mainly) but
against pedagogical reformers wanting to change the curriculum. Of course the warriors
do constitute an army, and the army does fight wars—and some attention is paid to the
army’s size (423a), to the wages, mess, and quartering of its soldiers (416d-e, 543c), to
the safety of gold and silver children, who as apprentice warriors accompany their elders
on campaign (466e-467e), to the rewards for courage and the penalties for cowardice
(468a-469b), and to the treatment of defeated enemies (469b-471b). But the army is not
ordered by ranks (phalanxes) or subdivided by jobs (archers, slingers, cavalry, hoplites);
its command structure is undeveloped (consisting merely of guardians and auxiliaries);
and its weapons, as with all the city’s goods, are rudimentary and unimproved. Often the
competence of this army is asserted (416e, 422b, 467c, 521d, 543c), but never is it really
argued for, and what prowess it exhibits seems more a function of solidarity and troop
morale than of soldierly skill (423a). Compared to carpenters, smiths, herdsmen and the
like, these warriors have no art, no specialty (Bloom 1991, 351); what they have instead
are finely tuned souls. Even their gymnastic training serves psychological purposes
chiefly (410b-c). Book V is where the rigors of the warriors’ lives under communism are
fully disclosed; it is a book conspicuously lacking in one-person-one-art specialists, for in
it are women given work and training belonging to men, comedians implored to be
serious (452c5-6), and philosophers compelled to rule as kings.
Might the warriors, though, be differentiated beings, even if not made that way by
the precise practice of art? Actually, they are distinguished from workers by metallic
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qualities and divided among themselves into guardians and auxiliaries. Collectively they
are a class apart—and then a class within a class. But individually they are quite alike.
Birth does not distinguish them, since, without families, they are neither well-born nor
base-born. Nor does wealth, since they have no property. And we have seen that art is of
no use here since they are not divided by military specialty. Some do command while
others obey, but guardians are promoted in rank, primarily it seems, because of their age.
They are the elders among the warriors, the auxiliaries the young, who, when senior,
become overseers themselves (412c, 414b). There are real differences of spirit and
intellect which must be passed on to the next generation, but the “courageous doctor”
who supervises the eugenic “marriages” struggles to disguise the inequality and its sexual
consequences with lies, ceremonies, and the charade of chance distributions (459c-460b).
And although the disguise is not complete, with martial accomplishments publicly
acknowledged (468a-e), the most fundamental of all distinctions, that of psychic worth or
natural aptitude, is disregarded in the end, since golden class status is accorded to all who
die honorably in battle (468e) (Benardete 1989, 121). They, and others who lead
exemplary lives, are in death worshipped as demons (469a-b). Significantly, it is not in
life, but in death, that they are worshipped, at a time when special distinctions can do no
harm to the egalitarian oneness of the city. In fact, so alike are the warriors that even
female warriors are the same, or about the same, as their male counterparts (454d-456b).
Indeed, so alike are they all that when one is joyous, all are joyous, when one is sad, all
are sad. Theirs is a “community of pleasure and pain” in which “most say ‘my own’ and
‘not my own’ about the same thing” and no one drags “off to his own house whatever he
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can get his hands on apart from the others” or introduces “private pleasures and griefs of
things that are private” (462b-c, 464c-d).
But are not the warriors dependent beings, seeing as how they depend on farmers
for their food, on weavers for their cloaks, on carpenters for their barracks, and on
armorers for their weapons? Yes, warriors do one thing and depend on others to do the
rest. But that “rest” does not include fancy meals prepared by gourmet chefs or advanced
medicines provided by expert physicians (403e-410a). The warriors’ education in music
and gymnastics is intended to minimize needs by anesthetizing appetites. Warriors
achieve near self-sufficiency by doing without, not by doing for themselves. And selfsufficiency born of self-denial is the goal because abstemious warriors are less likely to
covet the modest possessions of the working class. As for dependencies within their own
class, the absence of divided labor removes that source of diversity most responsible for
rendering workers interdependent beings. Warriors all practice the same, undifferentiated
martial craft, so there are no specialized archers on whom the hoplites depend. Warriors
do depend on guardians for their instruction, but that relationship is generational and on
the model of a family; and the final hope is that even these “family members” will
coalesce into a “single human being” (462c10) with a single set of experiences. In sum,
the warriors strive to exist as one uniform and homogenized being, not as interdependent
members of a multifarious class.
Plainly the warriors serve their community; the question is whether, like artisans,
they also serve themselves. The justice of minding one’s own business is self-referential
and self-interested (Craig 1994, 141). But the warriors receive practically nothing in the
way of material reward, and the spiritual reward of honor goes principally to
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philosophers. Thus, when asked if the warriors are happy, Socrates equivocates (420b421c).
Privacy, the first characteristic noticed, is the last characteristic considered,
because of its somewhat generic status.8 Are the warriors private? Hardly. They live in
public housing without locks on their doors. Their meals they take in common (416d-e,
468c-d). They possess no property, for the gold and silver of their souls substitute for
gold and silver vessels and adornments (416e-417a). They have neither spouses nor
children to call their own, nor parents whose love once nurtured them or whose identities
they even know. They pass through the same schooling, take the same exams, and—apart
from the sorting into guardians and auxiliaries (a distinction of no real consequence until
the appearance of philosophers)—do pretty much the same thing. They certainly meddle
in each other’s affairs, for what could be more private than the rearing of a child—but the
children are raised communally; or more private than sexual love—but the matings are
arranged by an agent of the city. The warriors live under communistic institutions, and
communism’s goal is to perfect the public and destroy the private (Nichols 1987, 62).
It is important to note that Socrates does try extending his definition of justice to
warriors and rulers, observing, for example, that rulers, when judging lawsuits, take care
to ensure an appropriate assignment of goods. This assignment, by causing petitioners to
have what properly belongs to them and to have nothing more, is thought to be an
instance of justice from another view. But it is “the having and doing of one’s own and
what belongs to oneself” that Socrates stipulates is justice, not the ruler’s judging as such

8

Dependency suggests (partial) association, but specialization, differentiation, and fee-for-service

suggest separate, private selves.
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(433e-434a). Socrates also states that warriors are just by attending only to their auxiliary
duties, leaving money-making to the workers and governing to the rulers, or that justice is
a matter of the three great classes staying in their places, not trading jobs and meddling in
each other’s affairs (434b-c). But then it belongs to the warriors to meddle in the moneymaking affairs of the workers, watching to see that no one is rich and no one is poor
(421e-422a).9 Nor is the warriors’ meddling limited to controlling profits and income
disparities, since the arts are further supervised to ensure the grace and harmony of all
manufactured goods, with standards of beauty imposed from without (401b).10 It will be
objected that such interference is a part of the warriors’ job. Agreed; but then it is a job
that sometimes overrides the class barriers otherwise thought to be essential to justice and
a job that mostly is indifferent to the technical specializations of one person one art. In
any case, minding one’s own business is proffered as a definition of justice before all the
institutions of the city have been disclosed (Craig 1994, 233), before it is fully revealed
(in Book V) that the warriors individually have no business of their own to mind.
Justice is defined as minding one’s own business, and private business is best
minded by the differentiated specialist sticking to his craft, while at the same time
exchanging goods and services with complementary specialists sticking to theirs. The
warriors, though, do not mind their own business (except in the attenuated sense of
forswearing property and supremacy); instead, they mind each other’s business and are
9

Warriors are called guardians on the occasion because philosophers have yet to be introduced.

10

It is Socrates and his cofounders who comprise the supervisory “we”; but once the city is set in

motion, the work of supervising the arts falls to philosopher-kings and to warriors—which is to say that the
city’s police are involved in the enforcement of aesthetic norms. Would their oversight be any less
meddlesome to the workers than having, say, a Communist Party monitor present on the factory floor?
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consummate busybodies. Are we to conclude then that the warriors, the city’s most
representative members (419a), are unjust for possessing none of the characteristics of
justice? Such a conclusion is too improbable, however much some sections of the
dialogue might suggest it. Better, then, to say that the warriors practice justice differently,
but so differently that one wonders why Socrates would still want to call what the
warriors do “minding one’s own business.”

Justice Defined
We will consider later the dialogue’s purpose in bringing forward a definition of
justice so ill-suited to the warrior class. For now, let us look again at the definition itself
and at what it implies. That look will uncover problems with the definition, problems
which go to explain Socrates’ intention in eschewing the commonsensical definition of
justice, as a social virtue, in favor of one so asocial and paradoxical.
Artisans in a city and appetites in a soul constitute parts of civic and psychic
wholes, and justice obtains, it has been said, when parts stay in their places and do their
own thing. But why are parts willing to play a subordinate’s role? What interior state
disposes each part to perform its assigned function and to do no more? In the case of
artisans, that state is specialization, called “one person one art,” from which “minding
one’s own business” as the definition of justice later emerges (433a). Minding one’s own
business is the motive artisans have for being just, since by narrowing their focus to what
they do well, they are less attracted to what they do poorly and are less tempted to
interfere where they do not belong. A modern example makes the same point: unionized
carpenters would never presume to install wiring, nor would electricians presume to hang
sheet rock. Justice is given this privatized definition because specialized labor explains
16

why artisans keep to their tasks and respect the organization of the economy and the
economy of the whole. Or, put differently, specialized labor explains the manner in which
artisans behave justly—the how instead of the why. Artisans maintain order by
contentedly practicing their single trades and leaving the management of the city to
others. Justice is the maintenance of order—at least when examined at the level of the
part. Since artisans are not rulers with supervisory duties, artisans contribute to the
maintenance of order merely by honing their technical skills.
But the situation is different for warriors. While not rulers themselves, they
nonetheless are public persons with public responsibilities. They know more of the city’s
business than do artisans, and they defend the city’s order, less by minding the business
of javelin throwing, than by lending loyal support to philosopher-kings. In this, their
motive is patriotic devotion, self-sacrifice, and class solidarity, rather than one-personone-art specialization. Warriors are actively just, maintaining order by what they do—
defense—unlike artisans who are passively just, maintaining order by what they refrain
from doing—meddling.11 Also, warriors have power. They are the strong and spirited
ones, the ones with training as soldiers and access to arms. If injustice is to their liking,
no person or institution is positioned to stop them. And so injustice must never be to their
liking. To that end they are reared to love the city and serve the common good. The
temptations of private goods do not much disturb them because they are one with the city
and take its good to be their own. Should artisans succumb to these temptations, warriors

11

The injunction against meddling applies also to warriors (434b-c), but only to their interclass

relations; and even then it is blunted by the fact, as argued above, that warriors cross class lines when they
intervene in the economy.
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stand at the ready to police their unjust behavior; but with no police force outside their
own ranks, warriors must internalize a sterner morality, a morality able to direct and
constrain even though lacking the philosopher’s knowledge of natural justice.
Selfishness, of a kind—a satisfied and unambitious selfishness—is the foundation of
artisan justice; for artisans are just by developing their differences, by minding their
private business, and by separating themselves from the whole. But selflessness is the
basis of warrior justice; for warriors are just by disavowing their differences, by meddling
in the business of others, and by losing themselves inside the whole.
While minding one’s own business is justice as experienced and practiced by the
part—and by the artisan part more obviously than by the warrior part—viewed from afar,
justice is the order of a whole. Order, right order, is the better, more comprehensive
definition of justice. Socrates implies as much when at 443d he describes the concord of a
rightly ordered soul, with parts cooperating as friends or as notes on a harmonic scale.
Once elsewhere does Socrates associate justice with harmony, in his attempt to prove to
Thrasymachus that the just soul is mightier than the unjust soul—for justice causes
harmony, and harmony causes strength, whereas injustice causes faction, and faction
causes weakness (350d-352b). Immediately thereafter (this time wanting to show that the
just soul is happy) Socrates associates justice with virtue, and virtue with power needed
for work. Eyes and ears have work peculiar to themselves (seeing, hearing), and virtue is
the power (sight, hearing) by which the organ’s work is properly done (352e). The soul’s
work, he says on the occasion, is managing, ruling, deliberating, and living (353d); and
the soul’s power, he later states, at 518c, is prudence (to which animation should be
added to account for living). Also, at 518c, he likens prudence in the soul to sight in the
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eye, each a natural power that depends on the proper orientation, upward toward light, to
accomplish its work. Art, or education, is the agency which effects this “turning around”
(periagōgē) (518d4), in the course of which other virtues, “produced by habits and
exercises” (518e1-2) are developed and lend assistance. Justice is among these
conventional virtues. Justice is the right orientation, organization, or conditioning of a
soul such that its natural, even “divine” (518e2), power of prudence can perform its true
function. Or, as said at 443e, justice is any act which helps to produce and sustain this
right condition; or again at 444d-e, justice, equated now with virtue, is “a certain health,
beauty, and good condition of a soul” (euexia psychēs) (444e1).
Although there is some imprecision about whether justice is a single virtue or is
virtue entire, in light of the above citations, it seems appropriate to say that justice/virtue
involves three fairly distinct elements. It is, first, the power, faculty, or capacity present
in any natural or artificial thing. Horses have virtue, the capacity to run, carry, and pull;
likewise pruning knives have virtue, the capacity to cut vines (352d-353a). Virtue,
secondly, is correct conditioning, which in the case of a horse is the nourishment,
exercise, and rest needed for health, and which in the case of a pruning knife is the care
and maintenance of a well-sharpened blade. In the case of multipartite organisms or
machines, conditioning also is the right assembly of parts. Finally, there is work, a
function of power. Because horses have the power to run, running is their work.
Creatures other than horses also run, but not as fast or with as much grace and stamina.
Horses are made for running—although some breeds run faster or longer than others,
while some breeds pull heavier loads or show more spirit in battle. Specialization is
therefore a critical factor, for the more specialized the power, the more certain is the work
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belonging to the agent. Specialization explains why vine cutting is the work of pruning
knives and not the work of daggers or leather-cutters (353a). Specialization is responsible
for the quality of work, but so also is conditioning since a pruning knife with a dull blade
may be worse at vine-cutting than sharp-edged dagger. Thus, a highly specialized power,
properly organized, oriented, or conditioned, as the case may be, has work to do and
performs it well, and the expert execution of work is what causes fulfillment or
happiness. Work-produced happiness is the end; virtue is the means. And either the soul’s
virtue is justice simply, or the soul’s virtue is justice (good condition) and prudence
(specialized power) combined. In Socrates’ closing remarks on the subject, justice is
enlarged to include the prudence of intellect, the force of spirit, and the desires of
appetite, each power trained and tempered and the three together arranged into a
harmonious whole (i.e., conditioned) (444d). That arrangement, rightly done, puts reason
or the philosopher in charge, with spirit or the warriors in an auxiliary station, and with
appetite or the workers in a subaltern’s role taking orders from above.

The Problem of Justice
To repeat: Justice is an ordering of parts (a conditioning of powers) that assists in
the performance of a task. The city is rightly ordered when wise guardians, aided by
spirited warriors, govern appetitive workers. But what purpose does the city realize by
being ordered this way? Has the city an objective which when achieved proves the
rightness of its order and justness of its actions? The easy answer is that the city’s
purpose is the making of philosophers. In most cities philosophical potential is squelched,
squandered, or despised (490e-497c); in Socrates’ city it is carefully cultivated. But then
Socrates’ city educates philosophers in expectation of using them as kings; and
20

philosopher-kings, rather than ends in their own right, are instrumental goods serving a
higher purpose. This we know, in part, from one of the dialogue’s many parables—the
“ship of state.” In the telling, Socrates likens the philosopher-king to a stargazer onboard
ship, a man whose astronomical expertise qualifies him as the ship’s true pilot, but who is
passed over, nevertheless, in favor of one or more assertive sailors competing for the
captaincy (488a-489c). The stargazer belongs at the helm because his navigational skills
are needed to bring the ship safely to port. But a question arises: Has this “ship of state” a
destination the reaching of which requires that knowledgeable stargazers be put in
charge, or is its function simply to stay afloat? Where is the city going such that it needs
philosopher-kings to get it there? Trading aqueous for terrene metaphors, we know that
the philosopher, at least, is going out of the cave, out of the land of shadows and into the
land of light. But it is not the philosopher’s mission to bring this sunlit truth into the cave;
nor is it his mission to escort all the citizens to the light above (Bloom 1991, 403). The
philosopher returns to the cave and rules there as king in order to establish a social
hierarchy (by assigning people to their respective classes), to prevent faction within the
warrior class (by monopolizing high office), to provide for auxiliaries deferential to
himself (by overseeing the music and gymnastic education and supervising the
institutions of communism), and to train his own philosophical replacements (by teaching
dialectics to a gifted few). Working backwards we discover the true purpose of these
activities: for students are instructed in dialectics so that there might be philosophers who
are kings; and there are philosopher-kings so that there might be warriors educated as
auxiliaries; and there are educated warriors so that the laboring class might enjoy the
blessings of a government that does not oppress. Without philosophers in authority,
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power passes to undisciplined warriors who exercise it for their own selfish advantage,
just as Thrasymachus asserts. “Rest from ills” (kakōn paula) (473d5) is the stated purpose
of philosophical rule. But “rest from ills” means domestic peace provided by good
government—in other words, staying afloat by the “ship of state.” It would seem,
therefore, that the “ship of state” has no destination, the city no function. Order is for its
own sake.12 But order is justice, and justice is virtue, and virtue is the power/condition
that facilitates work. Justice is, or is supposed to be, a means to something higher, not an
end in itself.13 It is a means to what is indubitably higher in the case of the philosopher
who uses the right ordering of his soul to ascend to the Good. But no other soul makes
that ascent, and, at any rate, the philosopher is for the sake of the city (520a), not the city
for the sake of the philosopher. Accordingly, justice is problematic because no communal
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This entails a good deal, however: a contented population deriving satisfaction from the precise

practice of trades and free of the uncertainty and exploitation that comes with a market economy and the
profit motive; a government that does its work well (better still if philosophers actually are in charge) and
that neither burdens its subjects with expense nor threatens them with oppression; and peaceful relations
with neighboring cities—more often than not. On the psychological level, order means beauty—which,
while not the highest good, can be for its own sake.
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We’re trapped in a means-ends cycle: The work of the soul—and by extension the work of the

city—is, we recall, managing, ruling, deliberating, and living. But it now appears that this work, and the
power exercised by it, namely prudence (leaving aside living), is for the sake of harmonious relations
(order/justice) rather than harmonious relations for the sake of prudence and its work. Aristotle could say
that prudence is an end in its own right and that the city’s work is to cultivate this capacity in all its
citizens; but Plato cannot, since too few people (philosopher-kings) practice this reasoning and since this
reasoning is not their true business and highest work.
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work is accomplished by it; and, except for the philosopher, no psychic work is
accomplished either.
There is a second problem complicating justice in the city. Justice is the
relationship of parts to each other and parts to the whole. Without parts comprising a
working whole, justice does not, cannot, exist. We have already seen that the whole is in
doubt since the city serves no purpose beyond its own well-ordered survival. 14 But an
even larger question pertains to the parts. Are people really carpenters, shepherds,
shoemakers by nature? They have aptitudes, inclinations, and opportunities, and if they
act on these, they develop skills and are able to perform competently fairly specialized
tasks. But in Socrates’ city they are assigned their jobs and sometimes compelled to stay
at them (374b, 406c, 421b-c, 519b-520a). If carpentry were a natural calling, would an
assigner be needed to discover this woodworking aptitude, and would compulsion be
needed to keep carpenters at their labors? It appears that either the city does not respect
natural aptitude in every case, and occasionally converts carpenters into, say, stone
masons, or that natural aptitude is less certain, less determinative, and frankly less useful
than Socrates would have it be. For the city needs not just carpentry but specialized
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A caveat is in order. Socrates says the following about the purpose of philosophic rule: “When

all the soul follows the philosophic and is not factious, the result is that each part may, so far as other things
are concerned, mind its own business and be just and, in particular, enjoy its own pleasures, the best
pleasures, and, to the greatest possible extent, the truest pleasures” (586e). The expression “truest
pleasures” suggests that some educational uplift extends to the whole community, perhaps in the form of
improved shadows more reflective of the truth of the Good (cp. 500e and 605b-c). Nevertheless, the
overriding purpose of right order in the city and right order in the soul seems to be friendship between civic
classes and psychic parts, lest they “bite and fight and devour each other” (589a4).
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applications of the woodworking skill. Now a person may well have an aptitude for
woodworking, but is there such a thing as a natural-born furniture maker distinct from a
natural-born home builder, shipbuilder, or wagon maker? How specialized can the arts
become and still be products of nature (Craig 1994, 144)? In fact, is not the very idea of a
specialist by nature something of an exaggeration, a fiction or noble lie serving the
interests of the city?15 The city needs specialized workers, and so the city sets about
creating them, fine tuning capacities and inclinations which nature only generally
suggests (Nichols 1987, 67-68). But if people are not this partial by nature, how rightly
ordered, how just, is the association which treats them as parts?
Carpenters minding their specialized business is not the real issue, however (421a,
434a), and by Book 4 Socrates de-emphasizes these professional designations, calling
carpenters, and their fellow artisans, money-makers instead (chrēmatisteis) (434a7-8,
441a1). As members of the money-making or chrematistic class, artisans represent the
appetitive many, and the challenge henceforth is to prevent money-makers from
interfering with the business of the ruling class and to defend the metallic divisions
against amalgamation (434b-c).16 The justice of the city consists then in separating
appetitive workers from spirited warriors from rational guardians and giving to each
group responsibilities appropriate to its nature. In the process, two of these groups
develop specialized virtues: prudence in the case of guardians, and courage in the case of
auxiliaries—and all three classes practice moderation. But how different are these
15
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philosophers (scientists) are the product of divided labor.
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Reeve (1988, 242) names this division by classes, as opposed to division by arts, the “principle

of quasispecialization.”
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virtues? The prudence of guardians is once described as knowledge of the city as a whole
(428d). But the examinations which identify guardians do not test their knowledge, but
rather their steadfastness, stubbornness, and lack of curiosity. Guardians are those among
the warriors whose opinions cannot be stolen from them by speech or by time, or taken
forcibly from them by grief or by pain, or surrendered unwittingly by them owing to
bewitchment by pleasure or fear. Guardians are dogged defenders of the opinions
communicated by the city’s education (413b-414a). They guard the city by caring
intensely for its institutions more than by knowing acutely its business.17 Their prudence,
such as it is, rests on habit and experience and reflects the wisdom that comes with age
(522a). They supposedly are different from auxiliary warriors whose class virtue is
courage. But warrior courage is similarly defined as the preservation of opinion, in
particular the opinion that educational change is terrible beyond compare. Likened to a
colorfast dye, warrior courage is touted for its resistance properties, its insensibility to
pain, fear, and bodily desires. Speech and forgetfulness are not repeated, so it is possible
that guardians have some intellectual defenses against sophistic novelties and better
memories. But the difference seems one of degree, not of kind. After all, what the
guardians guard is exactly what the auxiliaries guard, namely the education and rearing
from subversive change (423e-424c). As for moderation, called “a certain kind of order”
(430e6), it is barely distinguishable from justice (a certain kind of order), the former
17

The guardians’ skill seems to be a product of their care, their care a product of their love, and

their love a product of their identification with the city (Bloom 1991, 365). It is interesting that in the
conversation with Polemarchus, care counts for nothing and knowledge counts for all (the just man knows
how to . . . steal! [332e-334b]), whereas in the description of (nonphilosophic) guardians, knowledge is
eclipsed by care.
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defined as agreement about who should rule (431e-432a), the latter defined as parts in
their proper places.18 In fact, so extensive is this blending that all virtues are
comprehended by the one virtue, justice. For consider: The city is just by virtue of the
classes minding their own business. When that happens, the classes also are moderate,
since they agree about whose business it is (and is not) to rule (thus moderation
effectively is justice). Some citizens are additionally courageous when they defend the
city’s education, the central tenet of which is the hierarchy of the metallic classes, or the
right ordering that is justice (thus courage effectively is justice). And some are prudent
when they care for the city which makes them its rulers—i.e., they care and are prudent
when by minding their own and the city’s business they are just (thus wisdom effectively
is justice). If differentiated by their virtues, the classes are simultaneously compounded
by their virtues, as moderation, practiced alike by rulers, warriors, and artisans,19 verges
into justice; as prudence and courage verge into each other, then also into justice; and as
justice, the comprehensive virtue, animates—indeed causes—moderation, prudence, and
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In the Charmides (161b-163c) minding one’s own business is offered as one of the definitions

of moderation.
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The fact that moderation is a communal virtue and not a class virtue suggests that ruling is

viewed differently by the classes. By the workers, ruling is viewed as a choiceworthy activity, and so when
the workers agree not to rule (and thus practice moderation), they are giving up something they take to be
advantageous and good. By the guardians (if only by the philosophic guardians), ruling is viewed as a
burden; called upon to assume this burden (347b-d, 520e), guardians too have need of (and by their
agreement practice) moderation. See Annas 1981, 115-16.
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courage.20 All these virtues relate to the order of the city; indeed, they all reduce to an
opinionated acceptance of the order of the city.
There is more equality in human nature than Socrates’ city chooses to admit. That
is so since all human types are mixed, with honor-loving warriors tempted by moneyloving desires (548a), and with pleasure-loving artisans capable of prideful rebellion
(556d).21 Radical inequality is confined to the philosopher, who, knowing being while
others opine becoming (475c-480a), seems practically of another species, a god among
men. And yet even the philosopher is mixed (547e), for as philosopher and king, he is
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Justice, Socrates contends, is the cause of the other virtues, providing for their existence and

their preservation (433b). It is easy to see how justice causes moderation, in that minding one’s own
business clears the way for agreement about whose business it is to rule. Nor is the causal relation of justice
to the good counsel of prudence that difficult to ascertain, since professionals doing their one thing are
more expert than amateurs dabbling in a variety of arts. Courage, though, is another matter; for how does
minding one’s own business produce hostility toward innovation? After all, it doesn’t in the arts, where
professionalism leads to progress. The answer, presumably, is fear of obsolescence. As defenders of the
city’s education, warriors have a set job to perform, which job inspires in them a commitment to the city as
it presently is constituted. Because innovation might leave them with no job to do, innovation threatens
their well-being and is regarded by them as evil. An important side effect is that warrior courage, used thus
for conservative purposes, is deflected from its more natural course, which is conquest and expansion. This
conservatism is eroded, however, to the degree that warriors engage in transcendence. See n. 29 below. For
another discussion of the relation of the virtues, see Reeve 1989, 236-43.
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people content to do one thing (397d-e).
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both contemplative and spirited.22 Truly pure types are not to be found instantiated in
matter but exist as forms intellected by mind. “Of the many fair things,” asks Socrates,
“is there any that won’t also look ugly? And of the just, any that won’t look unjust?”
(479a; also, 523b-c, 538d-e). Justice, the idea, is unsullied by injustice, but just men and
just deeds partake of their opposites. So also does the just city: its division into parts
looks just and unjust because no person or class is perfectly distinct from other persons or
classes (Strauss 1964, 118-19). Appetitive workers, for example, develop their rational
capacities through the arts that they practice, and spirited warriors can ally equally with
philosophers or money-makers (441a, 547e-548a).
It is not our thesis that no reality attaches to reason, spirit, and appetite, or that
significant differences in tendencies and aptitudes do not exist.23 People are unequal—
only not as unequal as natural justice requires. No person (with faculties unimpaired) is
so captured by appetite as to be devoid of spirit and reason; and no person is so head-inthe-clouds abstract as to be disconnected from emotions and physical needs. Perfect
justice obtains—or would obtain—where there were bodiless brains and brainless bodies
united to form an operational whole. But people are not made this way, and so the union
of people is less than essential and less than perfectly just.24 All three parts of the soul are
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education in mathematics and dialectics which produces the philosopher builds on the music and gymnastic
education which produces the warrior (503a-e).
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He notes that people divide into types automatically depending on the objects of their love: a few love
truth; a few more love competition and honor; most love wealth, ease, and pleasure (161).
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present in every soul (505e, 518c). Accordingly, it is inexact to portray the artisan as
personified appetite or the warrior as personified spiritedness. It also is inexact to treat
the city as an image of the soul (Annas 1981, 129-31; Williams 1999, 255-65). The
individual person is a potential whole, who, for the sake of the city, is turned into a part
(though not without notice taken of personal strengths and weaknesses). To say this is not
to deny that people are incomplete; but they respond to their incompleteness by aspiring
to be more. Some workers aspire to be inventors; some warriors aspire to be rulers. All
people aspire to be happy, and happiness requires that potentially whole people rise
above the civic roles they are assigned (420b).25 The trouble with justice, defined as
maintenance of order, is that it condemns human aspiration that exceeds the limits of
talent or the needs of the city. Workers wanting to be citizens are unjust, as are warriors
wanting to have families.

The Transcendence of Justice
The anomaly of a warrior class exhibiting none of the (art-derived) characteristics
of justice was previously accounted for by the special policing function performed by the
warriors—the fact that warriors have power and so require a morality based on selfforgetting rather than on self-regard. A modest elaboration on the meaning of justice
helped further to explain the exceptional morality of warriors: to wit, justice is order, and
just people are those who maintain order (443e), the artisans by perfecting a trade, the
warriors by defending the city. As it happens, perfecting a trade is closely related to
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spiritedness aspiring to completeness is freedom, each achieved by rebellion against the strict order
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minding one’s own business (443c), the formal definition of justice, whereas defending
the city is only distantly related and seems not related at all when one reflects on how
meddlesome the warriors actually are. And yet the formal definition never changes to
accommodate the dilated occupation of the warriors. If justice is particularized work,
where parts of a whole mind their specialized business, then the effort by warriors to
mind the city’s business, renouncing the private for the sake of the public, while
ordinarily an act of justice, is by the terms of the dialogue an act of injustice or at least an
act of non-justice. So, a second explanation for the anomaly of a “non-just” warrior class
is that Plato is trying subtly to alert his readers to the problematic status of justice (that
order has no purpose and the parts are not real), while Socrates is trying subtly to wean
his interlocutors from their need for justice—to dampen, that is, their demands for perfect
order, where everything is exactly as it should be (e.g., 358d, 366e, 367e).26 By this
account, the warriors are not just (i.e., specialized, differentiated, dependent,
compensated for services, private) because the dialogue is moving steadily toward the
transcendence of justice, sowing discontent with partiality and place by enlarging the
range of class-bound responsibilities.27 The warriors transcend justice (parts in their

required by justice.
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This is Nichols’s thesis (1987, 44-47, 58-66). Mine differs in that I associate with perfect justice

diversity, partiality, and dependence, whereas Nichols associates with it uniformity, universality, and selfsufficiency. In my view, the individual surrenders his separate self, not in the city, practicing justice by
doing and knowing his own, but outside the city, transcending justice by daring to do and know all—and,
mutatis mutandis, in the various attempts to do and know more.
27

Diskin Clay (1988, 21-23) argues, in response to Karl Popper’s closed-society thesis, that the
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places) in the sense that they identify with their class and their class with the city. They
interest themselves in public affairs (contracts, lawsuits, imposts, regulations, etc.) (425cd, 433e)28 and expand their horizons beyond weapons proficiency. They further combine
with the city, itself undying, by sacrificing their mortal selves in combat. This they do
notwithstanding the fact that the city, whose closed education they ferociously defend,
becomes a laboratory for the discovery of new disciplines (528a-c)—and so as the city
opens itself to new ideas, so also must the warriors. (What are the warriors supposed to
think when solid geometry is added to the curriculum? Surely, they cannot go on
believing that change necessarily is decline from perfection.) But most telling in this
campaign to lift the warriors from the particular to the universal (from parts to wholes) is
the injunction that they regard all of Greece as but one city, and warfare among Greeks as
but faction among citizens (470b-471b). Warriors are noble dogs who love the familiar
and hate the unknown (375d-e); under Socrates’ tutelage, the boundaries of the unknown
recede for these warriors, with Hellenic cities “incorporated” and barbarian lands
“surveyed”—since barbarians are now treated as formerly were Greeks (471b). Initially
told that their birth is autochthonous and that their city is native to its people like the soil

conversation, the Athenians to whom the conversation is related, the readers of the dialogue) whose
resistance is expected and welcomed. I would add to these “rebellious” audiences the citizens of Callipolis,
who, invited to develop themselves beyond the limited parts they are assigned, resist the order that justice
imposes on them.
28

There are few real laws in Socrates’ city in speech (Annas 1981, 105-06), and so case-by case

decisions determine many of these matters, with warriors acting as administrators and subordinate officials.
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is home to a plant (414e), the warriors finally are told that the whole of Greece is their
motherland.29
This effort to transcend justice—to go beyond it, escape it, resist it, overcome it—
is in fact constant across the dialogue, beginning with the first discussion of art and
continuing into the foundings of healthy, feverish, and purged cities respectively—to say
nothing of Callipolis, presided over by philosopher-kings. Artisans come in two varieties:
precise artisans and wage-earners. Precise artisans think not of themselves, but of the
needs of their customers (342c)—or if they think of themselves, they endeavor to satisfy
their artistic, not their material, needs. Artisans are enjoined to concentrate on the
perfection of their arts and to disregard the pleasures of wage-earning. In this they face a
pedestrian version of the choice between philosophy and tyranny—the satisfactions of the
mind versus the satisfactions of the body. They transcend their bodies, even their
personal identities, in the process of becoming physicians in the precise sense, musicians
in the precise sense, etc. They do not “get the better of” (pleonektein) their equals or
superiors, because they know their art well enough to respect its standards and to honor
those practitioners blessed with surpassing talent (349b-350c). They are paid a fee, but
the wages they earn come to them as add-ons and as a secondary affair (e.g., the trained
physician who secondarily is a businessperson managing an office) and not from the
practice of art, per se. Thus, from the start, precise artisans are put on a path of
transcendence. Innovation is a transcending of established patterns; and while precise
29
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and its fixed institutions (e.g., curriculum) allowed to change. Transcendence causes evil as well as good,
which is why the dialogue mainly, or overtly, is against it. See n. 20 above and pp. 34-36 below.
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artisans are forbidden to innovate (422a), they will do so nonetheless (they will rebel),
since innovation is an invariable consequence of divided labor (370c) and preciseness a
measure with no fixed meaning.30
Precise artisanship is a concept that appears again in the city of pigs. It is
noteworthy that Socrates, when looking for building blocks of this his first city, chooses
art over family, knowledge over love. Had he chosen otherwise (as does Aristotle, for
example),31 particularity and exclusivity would have figured more prominently in the
city. Blood, not trade, would have acted as the bond of union. Rational and objective
standards of regularity, efficiency, and precision would have counted for less. And the
groundwork would not have been lain for women to transcend their biological mission
and to function instead as artisans, warriors, or philosophers, depending on their
individual psychic talents. Technical knowledge does separate and particularize (one
person one art), but hardly to the same extent as do kinship relations. Precise artisans
honor the best; family units favor their own.
The feverish city emerges out of the city of pigs at the point where appetites are
emancipated and legitimized. If reason is a universalizing activity, appetite is a localizing
one. Accordingly, the feverish city is not rising toward universality but slouching toward
particularity. On the other hand, the city’s need of extra crafts opens its gates to new
arrivals, and its need of extra land brings it into contact with neighboring peoples.
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Initially that contact is violent and unjust; but it also is the beginning of a process which
culminates in the revelation that all Greeks are fellow citizens and all barbarians fellow
Greeks. Of course, in between comes the purging of appetites and the assignment of
individuals to their respective metallic classes.
The purged city is the perfection of one-person-one-art particularity. It is the place
where justice, once located, is determined to mean minding one’s own business. But even
here there is wider knowledge in play than the professionalism of art. Workers are
moderate, not merely submissive and indifferent. They agree about who should rule, and
so the philosopher’s kingly business is partly their own, enough to enable them to consent
to his government. And the warriors’ education in music and gymnastics must be
extended to them too, enough that their souls can be properly assayed (415b-c; cf. 459e,
460b, 546d).32 Certainly they are taught the tenets of the Noble Lie, and so they learn
what the warriors learn, that the city is by nature, harmonious and one. And since they are
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(Politics, II.5.18-24). Hourani (1949, 58-60), Strauss (1964, 114), and Reeve (1988, 186-91) all argue for a
strict separation of the classes even at the cost of injustice toward artisans and farmers with golden- and
silver-soul potential. Perhaps though an either-or answer is not what’s required. True it is that perfect
justice is impossible unless communism applies equally to all, but the city might still take a stab at
discovering gold and silver prodigies among the bronze and iron workers by providing all its children with
edifying stories (389d-e), organized exercise (410a), and mathematical instruction of the simplest kind
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tasked with creating beautiful wares to help tame the warriors’ spirit (401b-c), they must
to some degree imbibe the warriors’ sense of beauty.
The dominant lesson issuing forth from the city of appetites purged is that
workers and warriors must stay in the places to which they are assigned and that it is
unjust to be more than one can be. Is it though unjust to be all that one can be? What are
we to make of those artisans who try their hand at philosophy because “their bodies are
mutilated by the arts and crafts . . . [and] their souls are doubled up and spoiled as a result
of being in mechanical occupations” (495d; also, 522b)? For some artisans, the “subtlest”
at their crafts, art is a “prison,” Socrates admits (495d4, d2). Are they unjust for flying
from their confinement toward occupations more challenging and magnificent? If justice
condemns their aspiration, because order is disturbed by ambition, freedom, and
excellence pursued, then is not something amiss with justice, and might the
transcendence of justice take on the character of an obligation to oneself?
We have overreached. The artisans just described are labeled impostors by
Socrates, unworthy suitors of the maiden philosophy. Their ambition is unjust because
they aspire to a position they cannot fill and do not deserve. Presumptuous of their worth
or disdainful of merited status, they are akin, Socrates suggests, to a bronze worker, who,
released from his bonds and possessing some silver, asks for the hand of his
impoverished master’s daughter. They marry, bondsman and daughter, but their union is
unnatural, yielding offspring who are deformed, “sophisms” in place of “true prudence”
(496a8-9). The imagery used by Socrates implies that the artisan-sophist is male, while
philosophy, the beloved, is female. By contrast, the philosopher, pictured elsewhere, is
both male and female—and offspring to boot:
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It is the nature of the real lover of learning to strive for what is; and he does not tarry by
each of the many things opined to be but goes forward and does not lose the keenness of
his passionate love nor cease from it before he grasps the nature itself of each thing which
is . . . . And once near it and coupled with what really is, having begotten intelligence and
truth [male], he knows and lives truly, is nourished [offspring] and so ceases from his
labor pains [female], but not before (490a-b).

The philosopher is complete, whole, and self-sufficient. He is all that he can be,
exiting the cave of society and dwelling among the forms. The dialogue celebrates his
achievement even though his self-sufficiency means that no longer is he part of an entity
larger than himself and that therefore he is not just. For justice requires membership in
and dependence on a group; but the philosopher has left the city, does not need the city,
and is not naturally a part of the city.33 The philosopher compelled to rule is like a
vocalist capable of solo performances but made to sing accompaniment in a chorus. 34 Is
justice human excellence developed to the fullest, or excellence compromised but put to
service in an association of unequals (Craig 167, 1994)?35 By all accounts it is the
latter—parts keeping to their places for the sake of a whole not generally comprehended.
But there is this contrary action whereby parts transcend their places so as to upgrade
their business and widen their perspective. Artisans, warriors, and philosophers all extend

33

The philosopher’s relation to the city is contractual, not natural—the repayment of a debt

incurred, not the association of a part with the whole.
34

Aristotle, Politics, III.13.21.
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Similar problems are encountered with state welfare and public education. People capable of

caring for themselves are forced into association with people less able—and the former want out, out from
under high taxes and bad schools. Their reward, like that of the philosopher compelled to rule, is political
influence beyond what their numbers would justify.
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themselves in the direction of universality, augmenting their narrow arts of making,
fighting, and guarding with employments more comprehensively conceived—consenting,
governing, philosophizing. When they do so, however, order is disturbed and injustice
committed. Education destabilizes order and is putatively unjust.36 Is education good,
notwithstanding its unjust effects? If it is, then is justice not good, or what kind of good is
justice (357b-358a).37 When the soul makes its ascent to the Good, it does so dissociated
from the body and dissociated from its spirited and appetitive parts (532c). Reason
associated, including reason ruling, is reason maimed, for the body and the soul’s lesser
parts constitute a community that maims the contemplative properties of the soul (611b).
Reason is fulfilled and happiness achieved when reason is alone, minding its noetic
business, rather than associated, minding the political business of human beings.38 This
utmost in human striving can be alternately regarded as divinization and the soul’s

36

The city’s education is as responsible for these disturbances as is the ambition and restlessness

of the individual. The education comes in stages, each stage topped off by examinations. Presumably, some
of those educated will fail the exams and in failing be returned to a lower, auxiliary position. But they will
not be like other auxiliaries who never were exposed to the more advanced, say dialectical, training. These
failures (and all others up and down the educational line) will exist in between the fixed places of society,
exceptions to society’s ordering and to its justice.
37

Justice is a partial good, a consequence of the fact that people are needy, dependent, and

incomplete (or that the soul is a composite). As a remedy for an imperfect human condition, justice seems
onerous and debilitating whenever a more perfect human condition is dreamed of and aspired to.
38

There are, I believe, two passages which suggest that the philosopher benefits from his work as

guardian (497a, 499b). But then there are many others which suggest or imply the opposite (347b-d, 489b,
519c, 540a). Nor should it be forgotten that the philosopher is wanted as guardian because he alone looks
upon ruling as a “necessary thing,” not as a good (520d-521a). See In Ha Jong 1996, 95-96.
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salvation (500c-d, 589d, 590d), or as hubris and (changing spiritual traditions) original
sin. For the most part the dialogue adopts the latter view (e.g., the bronze worker’s rebuff,
the philosopher’s descent), but the encouragement it gives to enterprise, growth, and
transcendence shows the former view to be present as well. There is a challenge put to
Socrates to prove justice congruent with the happiness of the individual. This is not a
challenge that Socrates satisfactorily can meet. The associational requirements of justice
are static and confining; the educational needs of the individual are dynamic and
expanding.

Conclusion
When students are asked if they would like to live in Plato’s Callipolis, not many
respond affirmatively—and this despite the fact that, to a surprising degree, they already
do. For while on campus they live in barracks called dorms; they eat their meals
communally, in messes called student centers; they have little or no money, or little or
nothing to spend it on; and those who bring cars have no place to park them; they have
friends and acquaintances, but not spouses and children, and their sexual partners they
change frequently; they spend their days in study (of course they do!) and depend on
others to supply their material needs; finally, they are watched and graded and promoted
according to merit, with a chosen few invited to join the “guardian class” by becoming
professors themselves. Still, they denounce the Republic—firmly, consistently, and
almost unanimously—and by implication the lives they presently are leading. Their
objections to the best city’s practices are numerous, to be sure (the censorship of poetry,
the telling of lies, the abolition of families, the exposure of children, etc.), but none is so
common or so vehemently expressed as their dislike of job specialization. Partly they
38

worry about premature judgments (this partly caused, one suspects, by their recently
having taken the SATs!); partly they crave choice and variation and expect that doing the
same thing always, no matter how well, can lead only to boredom; partly they are
egalitarians and will countenance no discriminations of any sort. Mainly though they see
assignment to class as a discouragement to ambition, effort, and self-improvement—good
things all which they expect justice to promote and reward. That justice instead says keep
to your place and mind your own business is incomprehensible to them and morally
repugnant. They think they are rejecting the Republic. It is the argument of this paper,
however, that the Republic supports them in their discontent and may even be responsible
for it, by greatly complicating, if not quietly subverting, its own teaching about justice.

References
Annas, Julia. 1981. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Aristotle. 1984. Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Benardete, Seth. (1989). Socrates’ Second Sailing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bloom, Allan. 1991. Interpretive Essay. In The Republic of Plato, 2nd ed. New York:
Basic Books.
Clay, Diskin. 1988. “Reading the Republic. In Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings.
Charles L. Griswold, ed. New York: Routledge.
Coby, J. Patrick. 2001. “Why Are There Warriors in Plato’s Republic?” History of
Political Thought 22: 377-99.

39

Craig, Leon Harold. 1994. The War Lover: A Study of Plato’s Republic. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Hourani, G. 1949. “The Education of the Third Class in Plato’s Republic.” Classical
Quarterly 43: 58-60.
Kraut, Richard. 1997. “The Defense of Justice in Plato’s Republic. In Plato’s Republic:
Critical Essays. Richard Kraut, ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.
Nichols, Mary P. 1987. Socrates and the Political Community: An Ancient Debate.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Plato. 1978. Platonis Opera, vol. IV. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
_____. 1991. The Republic of Plato, 2nd ed. Trans. Allan Bloom. New York: Basic
Books.
Reeve, C. D. C. 1988. Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Sachs, David. 1971. “A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic.” In Plato II: Ethics, Politics, and
Philosophy of Art and Religion. Gregory Vlastos, ed. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor
Books.
Strauss, Leo. 1964. The City and Man. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Vlastos, Gregory. 1971. “Justice and Happiness in the Republic.” In Plato II: Ethics,
Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion. Gregory Vlastos, ed. Garden City,
N.Y.: Anchor Books.
White, Nicolas P. 1984. “The Classification of Goods in Plato’s Republic.” Journal of the
History of Philosophy 22: 393-421.

40

Williams, Bernard. 1999. “The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic. In Plato 2:
Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul. Gail Fine, ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

41

